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The paper models the boundaries of the multinational ﬁrm by looking at a
simple trade-oﬀ between FDI (internal expansion with strong control rights)
and debt (arm’s length expansion with loose control rights) in the context
of contractual incompleteness due to institutional constraints in host coun-
tries, i.e. problems of commitment and, especially, corruption. It develops
a theoretical approach to the two main types of corruption: petty bureau-
cratic corruption and high-level political corruption. The model predicts that
multinational ﬁrms prefer FDI the weaker the ability to commit of the host
country, while both types of corruption shift the trade-oﬀ marginally toward
debt. Cross-country panel empirical evidence supports these conclusions.
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1 Introduction: Foreign Direct Investment,
Debt, and the Boundaries of the Multina-
tional Firm
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is often considered as an impor-
tant policy objective in developing countries. Justiﬁcations for this are vari-
ous. From a macroeconomic perspective, the argument starts from the neces-
sity to attract external savings to augment insuﬃcient national savings and
allow a higher level of investment in order to boost growth. Moreover, since
capital ﬂows are supposed to have diﬀerent degrees of stability depending on
their nature, FDI is perceived as safer for the country than other types of
capital, such as long term debt that may be diﬃcult to roll over when the
economic context changes (e.g. the debt crisis of the 80’s), and especially
short-term inﬂows that may reverse quickly in case of shocks (as happened
in Latin America after the 1995 Mexican crisis or in 1997 in some Asian
countries)1. From a microeconomic perspective, it is generally stressed that
FDI improves the eﬃciency of capital, through transfers of technologies and
formation of human capital, as well as through important spillovers and ex-
ternalities in the whole industrial sector of the receptor country. These last
eﬀects, the argument goes, are even stronger in a dynamic perspective, as
FDI also stimulates competition.
The weak point, however, is the lack of a satisfactory theory of FDI. The
nature of the multinational ﬁrm itself has received a limited treatment in the
theory of international trade, in particular in the so-called “new trade theory”
and the “geography and trade” literature, as noted by Krugman (1995), pp.
1274-75: “Where the failure to have a real theory of the boundaries of the ﬁrm
becomes truly serious, however, is of course in the analysis of multinational
ﬁrms. (...) Why, exactly, did United Fruit want to own Central American
banana plantations (and often the republics in which they were located),
while many US sellers of personal computer clones seem reconciled simply to
contract with their Korean or Taiwanese suppliers? The answer is not at all
obvious from the international economics literature.”
The ﬁrst issue stressed in this paper is that most of the eﬀects attributed
to FDI are in fact produced by multinational enterprises (MNE) expanding
1To quote just some recent references on the stability and behavior of diﬀerent types
of capital inﬂows, see Frankel and Rose (1996) and Sarno and Taylor (1999).
1their activities to new markets and by the international diﬀusion of techno-
logical progress and corporate best practices, but that this expansion does
not necessarily take the form of FDI. As a consequence, evaluating the chal-
lenge of the attraction of technology for developing countries requires ﬁrst a
theory of the boundaries of the multinational ﬁrm.
In the last 20 years, the theoretical literature on multinational ﬁrms (see
Markusen, 1995, for a review) has basically developed around Dunning’s
“OLI” framework, which explains the multinational quality of a ﬁrm by mix-
ing technological and organizational characteristics (ownership), eﬃciency of
trade arguments (location), and considerations about the form of the involve-
ment in a foreign country (internalization). The ﬁrst two points refer to why
ﬁrms may want to expand abroad, while the third one has to do with the
ﬁnancial structure they give to their expansion. The decision of whether to
engage in FDI or not obviously belongs to this third category and is only
relevant if the two ﬁrst points justify the multinational nature of the ﬁrm.
To summarize, two diﬀerent trade-oﬀs are involved: the ﬁrst one responds to
ownership and location motives and is about going multinational vs. staying
national; whenever this ﬁrst problem is resolved in favor of multinational
expansion, a second trade-oﬀ arises for the ﬁrm, which is about exploiting
its potential advantages internally by investing directly in foreign countries
vs. simply selling or licensing its technology.
To focus on this second trade-oﬀ, consider the internationally accepted
deﬁnition of FDI from the IMF’s 1993 Balance of Payments Manual:
“Foreign Direct Investment is net inﬂows of investment to acquire a last-
ing management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock2)i na ne n t e r -
prise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum
of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and short- and long-term inter-
company loans between parent ﬁrms and foreign aﬃliates.”
From a standard corporate ﬁnance perspective, FDI is thus not the in-
vestment itself (the plant, the assets) but a particular way to ﬁnance this
investment, namely through equity and internal loans, that induces tighter
control rights on the subsidiary. An alternative way for the multinational ﬁrm
to take advantage of its speciﬁc assets would be to sell them directly to the
host country or to engage, as mentioned before, in some licensing agreement,
in which case it would in fact choose to hold a claim with looser control
rights on the project, which I broadly deﬁne as debt3. Whether the ﬁrm
2In practice, some countries set a higher threshold.
3The “Debt” denomination covers here, somewhat abusively, claims of diﬀerent nature
w h i c hh a v ei nc o m m o nt h a tt h e yi m p l yl e s sc o n t r o lr i g h t st h a nF D I .Ac l a s s i ﬁcation of
claims from the more junior to the more senior ones would be: 100% ownership FDI, joint
venture with more than 10% participation (thus still considered as FDI), joint venture
2prefers holding equity (FDI) or debt (selling or licensing) then depends on
t h en a t u r eo ft h ep r oj e c ta n do nt h ep a r t i c u l a rk i n do fr i s k si tf a c e s( s e eH a u s -
mann and Fernández-Arias, 2000, for an interesting discussion along these
lines). These must be understood broadly as including speciﬁc industrial or
climatic risks, as well as factors resulting from the nature of the information
available to the parties and the institutional structure of the host country.
Default on debt by sovereign borrowers, direct or indirect expropriation of
investments, and cases of corruption are some well known problems plaguing
relationships between foreign investors and host countries, in particular in
less developed countries (LDCs). We should expect these features to have
as i g n i ﬁcant impact on the ﬁnancial decision of the ﬁrms seeking to invest
abroad.
This paper’s objective is thus to oﬀer a simple theory of the multina-
tional ﬁrm’s boundaries in the presence of institutional constraints, focusing
speciﬁcally on the problem of corruption. Additionally, it provides some pre-
liminary empirical tests supporting the conclusions of the model, using data
on the cross-country composition of capital ﬂows for the 1985-1999 period.
The model’s basic building block draws on Williamson (1975), Hart and
Moore (1990) and Hart (1995): By taking or not a speciﬁca c t i o n( h e r ea
sunk investment to retain some “secret” on the technology) the ﬁrm chooses
ex ante the ﬁnancial structure of its investment, which has an inﬂuence on its
bargaining position in subsequent periods. The incompleteness of contracts,
arising from the possibility that the host country may renege on its commit-
ment, implies that the returns from the relationship depend precisely on this
ex post bargaining position, and so the ownership structure’s decision is not
neutral. At this stage, looking at the composition of private capital ﬂows,
the model provides a result in line with the existing literature, namely that
countries with lower levels of commitment receive a higher share of direct
investment because this type of involvement allows investors for an outside
option in case of conﬂict4.
To capture in a simple way the “institutional eﬀects” of information,
and allow for corruption to arise endogenously, I introduce the fact that the
real value of the ﬂow of externalities is known to the investing ﬁrm, but
uncertain for the host country, which has only prior subjective beliefs about
it. To model this, I extend under asymmetric information a simple game form
implementing the Nash bargaining solution, originally proposed in a complete
information setting by Howard (1992) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
with less than 10% participation, licensing (where the ﬁrm retains some technological
“secret” and get royalties), and debt (pure cession of the technology). For simplicity, in
what follows I will stick to the term debt, used to design a claim with weak control rights.
4See for example Albuquerque (2003) and other references discussed below.
3The paper’s main contribution is to propose a theoretical approach to the
eﬀects of corruption on foreign investment decisions. Two aspects are worth
mentioning. First, corruption is modelled as a game in which stakes and
side-contracts are endogenous. This is done by adapting the principal-agent
information-based model of corruption, in which an intermediate bureaucrat
is in charge of reducing the uncertainty on behalf of the principal (see Laﬀont
and Tirole, 1991), to the game-theoretic investment framework, and also by
considering the possibility of outright extortion, again interacting with the
ﬁrm’s private information rents.
Second, corruption in the context of capital ﬂows and foreign investment
is a multifaceted phenomenon5. I argue that corruption in such a context
can usefully be categorized in two main types. The next section documents
and discusses these two diﬀerent types of corrupt constraints.
1.1 Corruption and Foreign Investment
Bureaucratic Corruption
In the ﬁrst version, I focus on corrupt demands faced by ﬁr m so n c es e t -
tled in the foreign country. These demands, in the form of excessive admin-
istrative requirements, red tape and systematic bribe extraction by low-level
government oﬃcials, are the manifestations of corruption most commonly
evoked in the literature, as illustrated for example by Wei (2000) Wei and
Wu (2001) and Smarzynska and Wei (2000). Morisset and Lumenga Neso
(2002) document extensively the administrative barriers faced by foreign in-
vestors in a sample of 32 developing countries, listing them in 3 categories:
Entry approvals; land, site development and utility; and operational require-
ments. They show that such requirements are pervasive, the sample aver-
ages being 53 procedures and 443 days, and that higher costs and delays are
strongly correlated with the prevailing level of corruption, as measured by the
Transparency International index. Rose-Ackerman (1999) also oﬀers numer-
ous examples of such corruption. I shall refer to this case as “bureaucratic
corruption”.
I model the multinational ﬁrm dealing with a potentially corrupt local
bureaucracy by assuming that government oﬃc i a l si nc h a r g eo fa l l o c a t i n ga
license-type of good may require a bribe in exchange for the delivery. Foreign
ﬁrms are clearly at a disadvantage compared to local counterparts, because
of their lack of personal connections and knowledge of the local customs Fur-
thermore, in this case of petty corruption, it makes sense to assume that
5I thank two anonymous referees and the editor for stressing this aspect.
4bureaucrats have no speciﬁc information on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt6,s oIs i m p l y
consider that they chose the amount of the bribe by maximizing their return
in a context in which they risk being detected and punished. The level of
bribes then depends on how prone to corruption the environment is, and so
does the ﬁrm’s ownership decision. The model provides a clear and direct ef-
fect, namely that in a more corrupt setting, the trade-oﬀ becomes marginally
more favorable to debt.
Political Corruption
In the second story, corruption emanates from the interaction between
the ﬁrm wanting to invest and some high-level government oﬃcial in charge
of assessing the value of the investment and of negotiating beneﬁts to be
granted to the incoming investors on behalf of the country. I shall label it
“political corruption” to distinguish it from the previous story. It will become
clear below that the ﬁrm and local counterparts are equally involved in the
dishonest deals.
There are also plenty of illustrations of this type of behavior. While an
adviser to a Latin American government a few years ago, I observed that
representatives of foreign ﬁrms looking for investment opportunities in the
country would almost invariably be attended by very high-ranking oﬃcials.
It appeared that such practices often led to some rent extraction, for example
i nt h ef o r mo ff u t u r ej o i n tv e n t u r e sw i t ho ﬃcials’ front-men or by securing
employment for relatives in the newly established ﬁrms7.I n s o m e s e n s e ,
such meetings could be considered as evaluation rounds to assess how much
would be extracted from the incoming investment. On the other hand, ﬁrms
might ﬁnd an interest in entering such deals if they perceive that the resulting
connections may eventually help them securing speciﬁc markets or investment
opportunities. for example in procurement or privatization processes8.
Again, examples abound. Rose-Ackerman (1999) relates examples of
ﬁrms bribing high-level oﬃcials to obtain favorable treatment in privatiza-
tion, from the case of an Italian ﬁrm interested in a Greek cement company to
similar examples from Argentina, Peru, Zaire, Ivory Coast, Thailand and Slo-
vakia. Hines Jr. (1995) discusses evidence from a survey of 2,219 US business
executives in which nearly half of them would ﬁnd no ethical impediment in
paying bribes to further their company’s objectives. Looking at the behavior
of OECD ﬁrms in the aftermath of the OECD anti-bribery convention, and
with the US Foreign Corruption Practice Act (FCPA) in place for about 30
6The possible partial relaxation of this hypothesis is discussed in the modeling section.
7See Hines Jr. (1995) for empirical evidence that the “payroll” type of corruption is
indeed important.
8Note that in countries that have undergone signiﬁcant privatizations in recent years,
these in general accounted for the bulk of incoming FDI.
5years, Kaufmann (2004) concludes that they are “still extensively engaged in
bribery”. He also reports that bribery by OECD based ﬁrms in foreign coun-
tries sometimes exceeds that of local ﬁrms, giving evidence of a two-sided
corruption game between government oﬃcials and foreign investors.
The organization Transparency International releases since 1999 a bribe
payers index (BPI) emphasizing the supply side of corruption. It makes
clear that ﬁrms from diﬀerent geographical origins have varying propensity
to bribe9 and that, overall, there is “no doubt that large numbers of multi-
national corporations from the richest nations are pursuing a criminal course
to win contracts in the leading emerging market economies of the world.”
Furthermore, while public works and construction, as well as the arms and
defence sectors, are particularly prone to corruption by foreign ﬁrms, such
behavior is also observed, for example, in agriculture, leaving virtually no
sector untouched.
Finally, abundant press articles have reported cases of ﬁrms buying their
way into foreign oil, gas or telecommunication markets, among others. To
mention only a few, examples include the involvement of a French oil com-
pany (formerly Elf, now merged with Total) in cash payments to high gov-
ernment oﬃcials (including presidents) in Nigeria and Gabon; commissions
paid by a consortium including French Technip, Italian Snamprogetti and US
KBR, ﬁlial of Halliburton, to secure contracts in Nigeria; bribes paid by the
French electronic group Thales in Argentina in the 1990s; and accusations
of corruption against the French ﬁrm Alcatel, the Spanish electric equip-
ment provider Inabensa and Swedish Ericsson, to secure telecommunication
contracts in Costa Rica10.
Together, petty bureaucratic corruption and high-level political corrup-
tion can be argued to capture most of the corruption cases happening in
practice in the context of foreign investment. The main diﬀerence is that
bureaucratic corruption take the form of outright extortion and imposes a
pure loss on the ﬁrm, while political corruption generates the opportunity of
a gain for both the government and the ﬁr m ,w h oa r et h u sj o i n t l yr e s p o n s i b l e
for the corrupt transaction.
I model the second approach by assuming that a local politician is in
charge of evaluating the value of the project. This is a way to inform further
bargaining between the ﬁrm and the government, to deﬁne the content of
t h ei n c e n t i v ep a c k a g et ob eg i v e nt ot h eﬁrm, or even to decide whether to
attribute it a speciﬁc market. Conceptually, the politician is an intermedi-
9Companies from Russia, China, South Korea, Italy, the US, France and Spain for
example, have particularly bad scores. See press releases on the Bribe Payers Index at
http://www.transparency.org.
10See articles in The Economist, 13/11/03, and Le Monde, 16/10/04 and 05/11/04.
6ate agent between the principal and the ﬁrm, whose contractual role is to
reduce the asymmetry of information on behalf of the principal. One sim-
ple possibility is a political appointee of a government trying to maximize a
welfare objective function (note that non fully benevolent objective function
can be accommodated under this approach). Alternatively, the principal can
be thought of as the public, represented by the idea embodied in the consti-
tution or in the grand contract with the government in charge, in which case
the politician can even be the ruler himself as in some of the examples above
(see Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). The politician is entrusted with a role in the
maximization of some welfare function and enjoys decentralized power in the
form of information not directly veriﬁable by the principal.
This then gives rise to the possibility of corruption, whereby a better in-
formed agent takes advantage of her position to make a side contract with the
investor, sharing the potential information rent in exchange for a favorable
report. This is modelled in a hard information setting àl aTirole (1992), in
which the politician generates a veriﬁable signal on the project with some
positive probability and ensuring her honest behavior requires costly incen-
tive payments. Furthermore, I extend this setting to model the politician
choice of the supervision intensity as an eﬀort variable. With the monitoring
eﬀort of this politician depending on the potential reward as well as on the
potential gains from colluding, the bargaining position of the ﬁrm, and thus
the ﬁnal trade-oﬀ between FDI and debt, is aﬀected by the level of corruption
that prevails.
I then make simple comparative statics when the transaction costs of
c o r r u p t i o n ,t a k e na sap r o x yf o rt h el e v e lo fc o r r u p t i o ni nag i v e ne n v i r o n m e n t ,
vary. Again, its eﬀect goes counter that of commitment, i.e. more corruption
appears to favor debt. The diﬀerence, however, is that now it is eﬀective
through its interaction with the risk of expropriation.
1.2 Related Literature
There is a vast literature on foreign investment in the presence of institutional
constraints like political risk. Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) ﬁrst analyzed the
level and type of foreign direct investment under the risk of expropriation,
and introduced the idea that intangible assets would limit the host country’s
incentives to expropriate the investment. Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1994)
consider the rationale for tax holidays for foreign multinational ﬁrms in a se-
quential bargaining framework, and Thomas and Worrall (1994) endogenize
the size of the direct investment and examine its dynamic behavior when
investors are bound to rely on self-enforcing contracts. Relatedly, Bond and
Samuelson (1989) propose a two-period model in which the level of commit-
7ment of the host country is endogenized, and the ﬁrm can respond by altering
the capital intensity of its investment. These contributions share the charac-
teristic that they study the amount, input structure and timing of FDI when
faced with institutional constraints, but do not consider alternative ways of
transferring capital.
Albuquerque (2003) extends Thomas and Worrall’s framework to allow
precisely for diﬀerent types of investment (FDI or portfolio ﬂows) and the
possibility of exogenous termination of contracts. Assuming the inalienability
of part or all of FDI investments, coupled with the imperfect enforcement
of international ﬁnancing contracts, his model reaches two main conclusions.
First, ﬁnancially constrained countries, which empirically can also be seen
as the ones characterized by higher political risk, get a higher share of FDI.
Second, FDI commands a lower default premium and is thus less volatile
than other type of ﬂows. Similarly, Schnitzer (2002) looks at the trade-oﬀ
between FDI and debt in the presence of sovereign risk and ﬁnds that FDI is
more likely to prevail when it allows for a better exogenous external option,
the project is risky and the foreign investor has a greater eﬃciency advantage
in running the project11.
Recognizing the pivotal role of the risk of expropriation, the present pa-
per starts from a simple model yielding a conclusion similar to Albuquerque
(2003), namely that FDI is more likely in the context of higher political risk.
The common building block leading to this similarity of results is the inalien-
ability of part of the direct investment, or equivalently the existence of an
outside option for this type of investment in case of expropriation, although
to keep the model tractable when introducing corruption, I rely on a sim-
pler incomplete contract model of political risk, maintaining in particular the
probability of expropriation ﬁxed. The paper then goes on to model explic-
itly the impact of corruption on foreign investment. Speciﬁcally, it presents
theoretical approaches to the two types of corrupt behavior discussed above,
bureaucratic petty corruption and high-level political corruption. In doing
so, it ﬁlls a gap since the existing theoretical literature has not yet explic-
itly modeled corruption as part of the ownership decision in international
investment, despite mounting empirical evidence that corruption is one of
the factors seriously aﬀecting the conditions facing foreign investors.
Concerning the empirical analysis of the composition of capital ﬂows in re-
lation to institutional characteristics, related results are found, among others,
in Albuquerque (2003), Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000), Wei (2000),
11Related contributions include Janeba (2002), Goldstein and Razin (2002), Fosfuri
(2000), Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2004) and Tirole (2003), among others. They
are discussed in more details further on, while developing the model.
8Wei and Wu (2000), Henisz (2000) and Smarzynska and Wei (2000). The
ﬁrst two papers are based on cross-country regressions similar to the ones
I perform and reach similar conclusions. Hausmann and Fernández-Arias
(2000) conclude: “Hence, a larger share of FDI in capital ﬂo w si st y p i c a lo f
countries that are poorer, more closed, riskier, more volatile, more distant,
less ﬁnancially developed, with weaker institutions and with more natural
resources.” I broadly coincide with this assessment, although I ﬁnd some of
the variables mentioned not to be signiﬁcant. As for the paper by Wei and
Wu (2000), its main conclusion is that “corruption in a capital-importing
country tends to tilt the composition of its capital inﬂows away from foreign
direct investment and towards foreign bank loans.” This study relies, how-
ever, on a diﬀerent sample and data set. It is based on bilateral capital ﬂows
data from 13 developed countries to 30 less developed one, thus obviating
more developed countries as recipient. Furthermore, debt ﬂows are restricted
to bank lending statistics. Smarzynska and Wei (2000), using ﬁrm-level data
for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, also ﬁnd that corruption
makes ﬁrms prefer a mode of entry based on a claim with less control rights
(licensing). The conclusion of the illustrative empirical section of this paper
is similar to the previous literature, i.e. corruption reduces the proportion
of FDI in capital ﬂows. New is the focus on two types of corruption and
the evidence on diﬀerent channels through which it operates, in particular
regarding the interaction between country risk and political corruption.
Section 2 presents the simple model of the trade-oﬀ between FDI and
debt with credit constraint and lack of commitment and Section 3 introduces
asymmetric information and the two types of corruption in this framework.
Section 4 then presents the empirical evidence, and Section 5 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Basic Setting: Debt vs. FDI with Credit Con-
straint and Lack of Commitment
I consider the following three period model. Consider a country L, in which
local ﬁrms produce a good (or service) with a constant return to scale tech-
nology of marginal cost cL. This good is consumed by local consumers who
have a downward sloping demand function.
This technology happens to be a relatively ineﬃcient one: As a result of
investment in R&D and long term experience in managerial best practice,
af o r e i g nﬁrm F has developed an alternative technology which allows it to
produce the same good at a lower marginal cost cF. Technology here must
9be understood in the broad sense of technical as well as managerial and
commercial capacity.
Assume for simplicity that exporting to L is not an option because of
the nature of the product (e.g. telecommunication services) or for transport
costs reasons12. Both country L and the ﬁrm F, however, have an interest in
introducing the improved technology to L’s interior market.
F has increasing returns to scale, due for example to a large ﬁxed invest-
ment in the development of the technology, and wants to expand its activity.
As for country L, ﬁr s ti to b v i o u s l yb e n e ﬁts from increased competition,
thus higher consumer welfare. One possible scenario is the opening of a
formerly state-owned sector to private foreign ﬁrms. Second, the introduction
of a better technology has positive spillovers on the domestic industry, which
becomes more eﬃcient over time13: While in the ﬁrst period the indigenous
producers compete with their low cost technology (cL), the contact with F
allows them to upgrade their own technology and to produce in period 2 at
a lower marginal cost cLS.
The subscript t = 0 ,1 ,2 refers to time, with:
- t = 0, the benchmark situation in country L, with only
indigenous producers of cost cL.
-t=1 ,t h es i t u a t i o ni nLw h e nt h ei m p r o v e dt e c h n o l o g y( c F)
is ﬁrst introduced and competes with high cost producers (cL).
-t=2 ,t h es i t u a t i o ni nLw h e nt h ei m p r o v e dt e c h n o l o g y( c F)
competes with local producers who have beneﬁted from techno-
logical spillovers (cost cLS < cL).






t )i st h ep r o ﬁto fﬁrms using the “local” (resp. “foreign”)
technology, and SC
t denotes consumer surplus.
Assuming there is no discounting, the net beneﬁt of the introduction of
t h et e c h n o l o g yi st h u sg i v e nb y 14:
12The model could be extended to consider an initial situation in which the ﬁrm exports
to country L, without modifying the principal insights. See Fosfuri (2000) for a model
where the ﬁrm’s choice extends to servicing the foreign country by exporting.
13See Blomström and Kokko (1996) for an extensive discussion of spillovers arising from
the operations of multinational corporations abroad.
14We can also disentangle the competition and the technological eﬀects, by writing
G =( W1 − W0)+( W2 − W1)+( W1 − W0)=2 ( W1 − W0)+( W2 − W1).T h e i n c r e a s e
in welfare due to the change in the competitive structure of the market, which accrues in
both periods, is W1 − W0 and the increase in welfare due to the technological spillover
b e t w e e np e r i o d1a n d2i sW2 −W1. For simple downward sloping demand functions, it is
e a s i l ys h o w nt h a tG ,t h es u mo fb o t he ﬀects, is always positive, although the technological
10G =( W1 − W0)+( W2 − W0). (1)
I assume that the parties are risk neutral and that the surplus is divided
among them according to a Nash bargaining process15. Although at this
stage I can just compute the outcome in terms of cooperative game theory,
it is useful to introduce the extensive game form corresponding to the Nash
bargaining solution that I will extend later to the asymmetric information
case. The following three stage complete information game, which exactly
implements the Nash solution, is a simpliﬁed version of Howard (1992), pro-
posed by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
This game form has the advantage of being simple and thus easily extend-
able to an asymmetric information setting. In the present context I propose
an intuitive interpretation, which runs as follows.
The game is a simple three-stage alternated oﬀers bargaining. The ﬁrst
mover (the country) oﬀers a possible agreement Y =( y1,G−y1). The second
mover (the ﬁrm) responds to this oﬀer by a counteroﬀer X =( x1,G− x1)
and a threat to terminate the negotiation. Ex ante, the multinational ﬁrm’s
position runs as follows: “Given your oﬀer, I will quit with probability 1−p
(thus an ex ante threat). Furthermore, if negotiation continues and you don’t
accept my counteroﬀer X and insist in implementing Y , there is a probability
1 − p that I will decline any agreement.”
The mechanism which leads the players to choose the Nash solution is
quite intuitive: any initial oﬀer which fails to propose this solution can be
met with a “punishment” that leaves the initial player worse oﬀ than when
he proposes an equal splitting of the pie. This is because if y1 > G
2,t h e
ﬁrm has the possibility to choose a probability p<1, so that the negotiation
ends with a strictly positive probability. Faced with this threat, it is the
country’s best strategy to oﬀe rt h eN a s hs o l u t i o na n dt h eﬁrm agrees to
this choice by choosing X = Y and p =1 . Of course, the country would
never choose y1 < G
2,s i n c et h eﬁrm would again choose X = Y and p =1 .
(see Appendix 1 for a complete resolution of the game under complete and
incomplete information).
In a world of complete contracting, the ﬁrm would simply sell the blue-
print of the technology to country L, based on its total value. From now on,
I call this the “Debt” option, in the sense that the country (or some local
ﬁrm) simply contracts debt to buy the technology and the necessary inputs
eﬀect may be negative for certain extreme values of the parameters. We do not need to
consider any speciﬁc functional form for the development of the model and simply use the
fact that higher spillovers imply a higher global value of the project (see below).
15We discuss below the relevance of bargaining as a modeling tool in the present context.
11to make it work (machines, management), possibly collateralized by its ex-
pected gain from this acquisition, and sets up a locally owned ﬁrm endowed
with the new production process.
I assume that the parties bargain over the total value of the project.
There are several reasons why bargaining can be considered a reasonable
modeling option for foreign investment. In a context in which countries
strongly compete to attract investors, the discussions that are often con-
ducted by ﬁrms with one or more governments can indeed be considered as
a bargaining game. There is such anecdotal evidence, for example in the
case of car makers looking to establish themselves in developing countries
(Tsuge and Bartels, 2003). Considering the potential gains from the invest-
ments, both ﬁrms and governments bargain over a whole array of items to
deﬁne a distribution of the beneﬁts (see Moran, 1998). On the side of the
ﬁrm, these include tax holidays, subsidies and other supporting measures
like the ﬁnancing of infrastructure relevant to the future plants, e.g. roads,
electricity or phone lines. On the side of the government, diﬀerent types
of requirements are routinely used as a way to try to capture more of the
beneﬁts, for example domestic-content, export-performance, joint venture,
and technology licensing requirements. The bargaining approach has been
adopted by part of the literature, including Bond and Samuelson (1989) and
Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1994), who show that tax holidays can emerge
as the result of a sequential bargaining framework. More fundamentally,
the relevance of bargaining can be linked to the necessary incompleteness of
contracts involving sovereign parties (see Eaton and Fernandez, 1995, on sov-
ereign debt). Although the analysis of self-enforcing contracts is important
from a positive point of view and has provided fundamental improvements
in our understanding of capital ﬂows (see references in the introduction), the
actual occurrence of expropriations and renegotiations gives the indication
that, for some reasons, parties ﬁnd it hard to rely on such contracts.
The status quo payoﬀs of the parties, if the negotiation is abandoned and
the investment is not realized, are simply 0, so that the surplus G will be









Alternatively, the ﬁrm may choose to engage in FDI. In this case, it will
have to pay in period 1 a sunk cost K. This cost is linked to the need to
ﬁnd and negotiate with local partners and counterparts, to deal with local
bureaucrats, and to the investment in local physical and managerial assets
(construction of a new plant, adaptation to diﬀerent business conditions,
etc.). It is greater than it would be for the host country (or some local
12investor) who has better knowledge of local conditions and, by deﬁnition,
better access to the local administration. On the other hand, the ﬁrm keeps
t h ep r o p e r t y - r i g h to v e rt h et e c h n o l o g y . F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,Ia s s u m et h a tb o t h
the eﬃciency of the new ﬁrm in the host country and the resulting spillovers
for the local industry are the same regardless of the way the technology is
introduced16. As before, the ﬁrm bargains with the host country over a share
of the beneﬁts generated by its entry, now equal to G − K.W i t ht h es a m e








(G − K). (3)
Hence, in a world with perfect information and no commitment problems,
debt is always more eﬃcient.
This result relies, however, on a number of disputable assumptions, such
as perfect access to ﬁnancial markets for the host country, and absence of
strategic default. In fact, the total value of the introduction of new technol-
ogy being of high magnitude, country L is likely to be credit constrained in
international markets. In this case, a possible alternative is for the ﬁrm to
sell its technology against the promise of partial payments in each period,
according to the realization of beneﬁts. With a similar bargaining process,
the outcome in each case is the same as before, divided in two successive
parts. Calling G1 ≡ W1 − W0 and G2 ≡ W2 − W0, the surplus from a debt

























If the risk of contract repudiation exists, as it does in most of the world,
this option may however be plagued by a commitment problem. Country
L may indeed renege on its commitment at the beginning of the second
period and force a renegotiation. This is represented here by an exogenous
probability γ of expropriation, corresponding to the risk of repudiation of
16As for the eﬃciency of the organization resulting from the debt option vs. that of the
FDI option, the comparison is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, a subsidiary may
beneﬁt from speciﬁc spillovers from the parent company, that would not accrue to a locally
owned ﬁrm. On the other hand, local entrepreneurs may beneﬁtf r o mb e t t e rk n o w l e d g e
and information about the business conditions in their country (see Schnitzer, 2002). The
comparison of spillovers in both cases is thus also ambiguous.
13contracts by country L. To justify this, suppose that the host has the ability
to commit in the short run, but that no long term commitment is possible.
Considering for example that each period of the model lasts for several years,
the assumption of imperfect long term commitment arises naturally from
possible changes at the head of government or other shifts in the environment.
Before moving on, it is useful to discuss brieﬂy the form that this repudi-
ation may take with a debt and with an FDI contract respectively17.I nc a s e
of debt, it is straightforward to consider that the country simply defaults
with probability γ and forces a renegotiation in which the ﬁrm has a status
quo utility level of zero, thus appropriating the whole surplus.
In the case of FDI, the situation is slightly more complex. First, the
investor faces the risk of outright expropriation or nationalization of the
productive assets. The consequence is the same as with the repudiation of
the debt contract, since the foreign ﬁrm is left with a status quo payoﬀ of zero
in period 2. Second, it is exposed to a more subtle form of expropriation,
in which the host country manages to capture the rents generated by the
subsidiary through speciﬁc actions like modiﬁcations of the tax schedule or
tariﬀ duties18. In this case, the ﬁrm keeps the property rights over the
subsidiary and can react by taking actions that allow it to retain a certain
stream of proﬁt, for example shifting some of its subsequent production back
to another international location or through accounting gimmicks19.T h e
ﬁrm, being potentially able to recover a fraction of its second period proﬁts,
has a better position in the subsequent renegotiation20.T h u s , w i t h F D I I
17An early model of FDI expropriation is Eaton and Gersovitz (1984). As stated there,
to have expropriation actually occurring, there must be some randomness, which is re-
solved between the time of investment and the expropriation decision. Otherwise, in a
deterministic setting, investors simply refrain from doing investment that they anticipate
will be expropriated, so the eﬀect is on the size of investments but expropriation never
occurs. In a multicountry world, the commitment problem becomes even worse, as we
would have to take into account the possibility that the host country, once it has acquired
the technology, may resell it to a third party, thus capturing some of the ﬁrm’s future
rents. This problem would obviously shift the trade-oﬀ against debt and in favor of direct
investment. Its analysis would however require a more complex model, so we abstract
from it in the present version. Another related issue is imitation (Fosfuri, 2000).
18This involves common agency issues, as policy decisions depend on the FDI-debt
choices of many ﬁrms (see Tirole, 2003).
19If some of the local subsidiary’s production is eﬀectively shifted to a diﬀerent location
in period 2, the value of G2 itself might change. The following results would however not
be modiﬁed substantially, so we abstract from this additional complication to keep the
model tractable when introducing asymmetric information and corruption.
20See Schnitzer (2002) for a more detailed discussion and a model where both cases of
expropriation and an exogenous outside option for FDI are considered. Janeba (2002)
endogenizes this outside option by considering that ﬁrms may invest simultaneously in
14simply assume that the foreign ﬁrm and the host country anticipate that the
ﬁrm will retain a fraction of its second period proﬁts equal to θΠF
2 ,w h e r e
θ<1.
To sum up, I assume that both with debt and FDI, bargaining is over
the whole surplus and expropriation arises with the same positive probabil-
ity21 γ, followed by a renegotiation at t =2in which the status quo levels
depend on the ownership structure. Note that we keep the probability of
expropriation exogenous to maintain the basic model as tractable as possible
and concentrate on the modeling of corruption, which is the main focus of
the paper.
Now, with a positive probability that the country reneges on its commit-





















Figure 1: Timing when renegotiation is possible
The outcome of the bargaining process becomes the following. In case of
debt, the ﬁrst period surplus G1 is divided evenly, while in the second period


















(1 − γ)G2. (6)
two countries and use the threat to shift production from one to the other as a disciplining
device for governments.
21One way to endogenize the probability of expropriation would be to allow the ﬁrm to
chose the quality of the technology it transfers (see Fosfuri, 2000, and Bond and Samuelson,
1989). Alternatively, one could assume that expropriation occurs only when G2 − θΠF
2 >
1
2G2. In this case, the results of the paper would be qualitatively unaltered. While all
these potential extensions are interesting in their own right, we are not pursuing them
here.
15In case of FDI, following the discussion, at the beginning of period 2 the
status quo payoﬀso ft h eﬁrm and the host country are θΠF
2 and G2 − θΠF
2




















(1 − γ)G2 + γθΠ
F
2 .
Looking at the trade-oﬀ faced by the ﬁrm between the debt and the FDI
option, it is straightforward to see that:






This simple equation shows that now debt is not always preferred by the
ﬁrm and provides a key prediction, namely that a higher risk of repudiation
makes FDI more likely22. Moreover, the trade-oﬀ is more favorable to FDI,
the greater the share θ of second period proﬁts that can be recovered in
case of contract repudiation, the greater ΠF
2 , which is the case when the
spillovers are of small magnitude, and the lower the sunk cost K.T h i ss i m p l e
setting is thus consistent with the literature on political risk discussed in the
introduction, as well as basic empirical evidence on technological transfers23.
In the next section, I analyze how this trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by the possi-
bility of corruption.
3 Corruption
In a situation where the foreign ﬁrm has developed some speciﬁc technology
or know-how, it is natural to assume that it has private information con-
cerning its exact characteristics. I model this by assuming an asymmetry of
22Note that more sophisticated mechanisms could be envisioned, for example frontload-
ing the ﬁr m ’ ss h a r ei np e r i o d1i nc a s eo fd e b tt op u s h it to choose this type of involvement
more often. This would amount to endogenizing the parties’ bargaining weights. Again,
we do not pursue this line and concentrate on the issue of corruption.
23As for additional aspects, Markusen (1995) reports that most empirical studies support
the view that the internalization of technological transfers (i.e. FDI) is more likely for
R&D intensive ﬁrms with new and technically complex products. If we take the view that
this type of production is characterized by relatively low potential spillovers, because the
complexity of its products implies a less intensive linkage with domestic suppliers (which
seems to be one key factor for the transmission of externalities, see Blomström and Kokko
(1996)), this piece of evidence ﬁts well within our framework.
16information on the level of spillover that the introduction of the technology
would generate, which are known to the ﬁrm but not to the host country.
Assume that the net beneﬁtc a nt a k et w ov a l u e sGS and GW,s u c ht h a t
GS >G W, with the notation24 ∆G = GS − GW. The subscript S (resp. W)
stands for strong (resp. weak) spillovers and can be said to correspond to
the “good type” (resp. “bad type”) project. The host country has previous
beliefs about the realization of G given by:
Pr(G = GS)=ν
Pr(G = GW)=1− ν.
3.1 The Nash Solution with Asymmetric Information
To see the implication of the asymmetry of information for the bargaining
problem, consider again the extensive game form introduced above. When
one of the players has private information about his type, it obviously matters
whether the informed party moves ﬁrst or not. To avoid the multiplicity of
equilibria inherent to a signaling game, and to keep the model as tractable
as possible, I stick to the case where the uninformed party (the host country)
moves ﬁrst. The timing of the bargaining procedure is the same as under
symmetric information, with the only diﬀerence that now, when choosing y1
at the beginning of the game, country L does not know the true value of G
and acts in such a way that its expected payoﬀ is maximum. The complete
resolution of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this extensive game is
in Appendix 1.
Again, what happens is intuitively clear. If the country chooses y1 =
GW
2 ,
the complete information solution (thus the Nash solution) is implemented
with probability 1−ν (when G = GW), but with probability ν (when G = GS)
it incurs a loss since its initial oﬀer is less than
GS
2 .
On the other hand, if the country’s initial oﬀer is y1 =
GS
2 ,t h ec o m p l e t e
information solution is now implemented with probability ν (when G = GS),
but with probability 1−ν (when G = GW)t h eo ﬀer is too high and the ﬁrm
replies with p =
GW
GS and x1 =
GW
2 , so that the country suﬀers a loss with
respect to the Nash solution. Note that in this case both parties are worse
oﬀ than under complete information. This global loss of eﬃciency is typical
of such situations of bargaining under asymmetric information.
24Since we assume the uncertainty to be about the potential spillovers in the host in-
dustry, the distinction between a good type and a bad type project will only be relevant
in period 2, when the spillover eﬀect takes place. Thus, the beneﬁt of the project can be
divided in its two period components: GS = G1 + G2,S and GW = G1 + G2,W,s ot h a t
∆G = GS − GW = G2,S − G2,W = ∆G2 and ∆G1 =0 .
17Furthermore, it is shown in the appendix that an intermediate value of
y1 is never optimal, as the country’s payoﬀ is a convex function of y1,s ot h a t
depending on the value of the parameters, the best choice of y1 is given by
either y1 =
GW
2 or y1 =
GS
2 .
T a b l e1s u m m a r i z e st h eo u t c o m eo ft h eg a m ef o rd i ﬀerent values of the
parameters.






Host country: y1 =
GW

























* x1 = y1,p=1(both when y1 =
GW
2 and y1 =
GS
2 ).
** x1 = y1,p=1(if y1 =
GW




GS (if y1 =
GW
2 ).
I now consider how the diﬀerent types of corruption introduced above will
aﬀect the FDI-debt trade-oﬀ25.
3.2 Story 1: Bureaucratic Corruption
Consider a situation in which local bureaucrats are in charge of attributing
licenses to ﬁrms, for example authorizing imports of speciﬁc inputs or deliv-
ering health and safety certiﬁcates. As discussed in the introduction, these
low-level oﬃcials are unlikely to be have any detailed information on the ﬁrms
they deal with. Instead, I will characterize this type of petty corruption by
assuming that in period 2, they ask the ﬁrm that has chosen FDI for a ﬁxed
bribe B in order to issue the relevant license26.T h i sd o e sn o tm e a nt h a tl o c a l
ﬁrms are not themselves subject to bribes, but that foreign ﬁrms are better
25Ex ante, investors have superior information on the quality of their project. This
is true irrespective of the type of ownership chosen and thus in particular in the case of
“debt”. Alternatively, a corporate ﬁnance perspective on the nature of debt is likely to put
emphasis on the fact that debtors would enjoy superior information on some aspects of the
contract. However, the contradiction is only apparent. As will become clear below, FDI
does generate an additional informational edge for investors in case of renegotiation. Thus,
in relative terms, debtors do know more about the claim (or, to say it otherwise, they are
a lesser informational disadvantage) in case of debt. Other types of asymmetries could
be envisioned, for example about local demand conditions (in which case the government
could be the one having private information). In this case, a similar relative eﬀect would
hold and debtors would indeed enjoy the stronger informational advantage in the case of
debt.
26See Banerjee (1997) for a model in which government oﬃcials create red tape and
delays in the attribution of a publicly provided service in order to extract bribes.
18targets for corrupt oﬃcials, because of their relative ignorance of the local
rules and their lack of personal connections for example. Note that I dis-
tinguish the (ex post) bribe B from the (ex ante) ﬁxed cost of implantation
K.
Furthermore, I assume that, upon asking for a bribe, bureaucrats risk
being detected and punished with probability τ(B),w i t hτ0 > 0 and τ00 ≥ 0.
One explanation is that the ﬁrms’ willingness to denounce corrupt demands is
an increasing function of the amount of the bribes. In the limit, a ﬁrm faced
with a demand equal to or exceeding its total proﬁts would have nothing to
loose from denouncing the corrupt deal and the probability of punishment
would approach 1. Alternatively, huge bribes are simply more diﬃcult to
hide, because they involve observable transfers of wealth or, as is commonly
observed in developing countries, they result in public employees enjoying
acquisitive power beyond what their salaries would permit. These cases are
thus more likely to draw the media attention and be brought to light.
Accordingly, bureaucrats choose B by maximizing a return function of




Cross-country comparisons are simply derived by assuming that, for a
given level of bribe, the probability of detection is lower in a more corrupt
environment. Straightforwardly, in a context more prone to corruption, the
above maximization problem leads bureaucrats to formulate higher bribe
demands.
In order to see how bureaucratic corruption aﬀects the trade-oﬀ between
FDI and debt, ﬁrst consider the complete information case. Clearly, the
prospect of giving away an amount B does not modify the status quo of
the ﬁr mw h e nf a c e dw i t ha na t t e m p to fe x p r o p r i a t i o n ,w h i c hi na n yc a s ei s
given by θΠF
2 . However, note that when B>1









, the bribe exceeds the ﬁrms proﬁts minus its outside
option, so it will choose to leave the country27
The ﬁrm’s payoﬀs to engage in FDI and debt respectively are then given
by:
27While the empirical literature mostly focuses on how corruption may keep investors
away from speciﬁc countries, stories of foreign investors forced to leave by excessive cor-
ruption make regular headlines in developing countries. This will be the case if myopic
bureaucrats place demands such that they extinguish the source of the bribe. If ﬁrms an-
ticipate the level of B as in the present framework, this would never happen, as they would
just refrain from choosing FDI. However, one can envision unexpected ex post shocks lead-










(1 − γ)G2 + γθΠ
F























The trade-oﬀ then becomes:





















(1 − γ)G2 > 0 otherwise.
When the tolerance for bureaucratic corruption, and thus the expected
bribes, are high enough, the marginal eﬀect on the ownership decision dis-
appears. Moreover, if γ is not too large,
(1−γ)
2 G2 >γ θ ΠF
2 , and debt always
dominates.
Under asymmetric information, the results are quite similar. Consider
ﬁrst the case ν ≤
GW
GS+GW .W i t h F D I , T h e ﬁrm’s second period surplus
is given by 1
2(1 − γ)(G2,S + ∆G2)+γθΠF
2,W for a good type ﬁrm, and by
1
2(1 − γ)G2,W + γθΠF
2,W for a bad type one.
We can directly write the FDI-debt trade-oﬀ in the three possible cases:
• If B ≤ B ≡ 1
2(1 − γ)G2,W + γθΠF
2,W − θΠF
2,W, bureaucrats are able to
extract bribes from both types of ﬁrms and we get:










2,S, the bribe exceeds the bad type ﬁrm’s proﬁts minus its outside
















20• Finally, if B>B, bureaucrats completely extinguish the potential














Interestingly, we get that corruption favors a shift toward debt but, as
the proneness to corruption increases, the marginal eﬀect is decreasing and
eventually vanishes28.
Alternatively, it could be assumed that although bureaucrats are unable
to generate a signal on the true type of the ﬁrm, they share the common
knowledge belief on the value and distribution of its proﬁts. The maximiza-





I[B≤B]νB + I[B≤B] (1 − ν)B
i
,
where I[.] is the indicator function taking value 1 if the statement in brackets
is true and 0 otherwise. In this case corrupt bureaucrats would never ask for a
bribe B>B, and the analysis would be restricted to the ﬁrst two cases above.
The marginal eﬀect of corruption would again be decreasing but would stay
positive even in very corrupt environments. Although anecdotal evidence
seems to favor the ﬁrst approach, in which petty bribers are totally myopic
and ﬁrms may eventually be forced to exit the country, this is ultimately
an empirical matter. I summarize the results of this section in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Petty bureaucratic corruption, in which low-level public of-
ﬁcials uninformed about ﬁrms’ true proﬁtability place ﬁxed bribe demands,
shifts the trade-oﬀ of incoming investors toward debt. Moreover, the mar-
ginal eﬀect of this type of bribery is decreasing in the prevailing level of cor-
ruption, and may even become equal to zero if bureaucrats don’t know the
true distribution of ﬁrms’ type.
T h es i m p l ei n t u i t i o nd r i v i n gt h i sr e s u l ti st h a tb u r e a u c r a t i cc o r r u p t i o n
acts as a tax on FDI, thus making debt more desirable. However, if expected
corruption exceeds some threshold, debt always dominates and corruption
has no marginal eﬀect on the ownership decision of foreign investors.
28Note that when ν> GW
GS+GW , the three expressions for the trade-oﬀ are slightly modi-
ﬁed but the marginal eﬀects and the conclusions are strictly similar, so we do not present
the results to save space.
213.3 Story 2: Political Corruption
Because of the asymmetry of information, the host country is giving up a rent
to the investing ﬁrm. As the bargaining game takes place, a high-ranking
oﬃcial (I refer to her as “politician” in what follows) has the opportunity to
extract information on the true type of the ﬁrm.
As discussed in the introduction, I take the view that the politician is
under an (eventually implicit) contract with a principal (the people them-
selves or the highest tier of government) maximizing some welfare objective
function. The position of the politician gives her access to information not











Figure 2: Information Structure
Formally, consider a supervision technology à la Tirole (1992), where the
politician receives with some positive probability ξ av e r i ﬁable signal σ on the
good type investor (see Figure 2). To the extent that the politician pursues
her own interest, she has an incentive to collude with the foreign ﬁrm to
c a p t u r es o m eo ft h ei n f o r m a t i o nr e n t .
Collusion only occurs when ν ≤
GW
GS+GW , which is the only case where the
investor enjoys an information rent, so I shall therefore concentrate on this
case29. When the politician detects a good type project of value GS (which
29It is easily shown that with the information structure postulated above, when ν>
GW
GS+GW , the introduction of asymmetric information and the politician intervention have
no eﬀect on the trade-oﬀ between FDI and debt (see Appendix 2).
22happens with probability ν), she may collude with the ﬁrm to report the
project of being of the bad type (GW), and share the surplus 1
2∆G.
If collusion occurs, I assume that the politician has all the bargaining
power and gets the whole surplus.30 Moreover, when the ﬁrm transfers an
amount t, the politician receives only kt, where the deadweight loss parame-
terized by k (k ≤ 1) corresponds to the transaction cost of collusion31.T h u s ,
to prevent collusion, the politician needs to receive an incentive payment
s = k1
2∆G when she reveals a good type project.
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Figure 3: Timing with politician intervention
Consider that in order to have a signal with probability ξ,t h ep o l i t i c i a n
must exert an eﬀort, which has a disutility Ψ(ξ) (Ψ0(ξ) > 0,Ψ(ξ)00 > 0),
because, say, it is time consuming and her opportunity cost is high32.T h e
30This assumption is made for simplicity. Considering that the politician and the ﬁrm
get shares of the surplus equal to α and 1−α respectively, would not change the following
results. Note that while corruption can be seen as aﬀecting primarily the government, any
value of α above 0 means that the politician captures part of the ﬁrm’s rent, so corruption
also aﬀects foreign investors.
31k can be considered to capture both material diﬃculties in realizing illegal side pay-
ments and psychological traits of the corrupt agents, like their relative honesty or their
fear to be caught. See Laﬀont and Tirole (1991) for a discussion.
32In Mookherjee and Png (1995), corruptible inspectors choose their monitoring inten-
sity balancing potential reward, eﬀort cost and penalties. The main diﬀerence here is
that corruption is rooted in the asymmetry of information, so that the collusion proofness
principle holds and corruption never occurs in equilibrium. In our setting, heterogeneity
of politicians would be needed to have corruption at equilibrium.
23politician is rewarded with a payment r for each dollar that her report allows







Taking a simple functional form Ψ(ξ)=∆G
2
ξ2
2 for the purpose of normaliza-
tion, it comes immediately that ξ
∗ = r.
Anticipating this, the optimal contract with the politician will set the















where the ﬁrst term is the gain due to the report occurring with probability
ξ, and the second term is the cost of the incentive payment to the politician.
Thus, r∗ = 1
2, and an informative report is received with probability ξ
∗ = 1
2.
Consider now the case where the politician is potentially corrupt. We
have seen that she gets s = k1
2∆G i ft h es i d ec o n t r a c tw i t ht h eﬁrm is










where the side contract prevails if k>rand a truthful report is made
otherwise. The politician will thus choose ξ
∗ =m a x ( k,r).C o n s i d e r i n gt h i s ,
the optimal r is r∗ = 1
2 as long as k<1





∗ = k otherwise.
As k increases, i.e. as the environment becomes more prone to corruption
because of lower transaction costs, the intensity of monitoring ξ
∗ will thus
also increase.
In this simple informational structure, the collusion proofness principle
holds (see for example Tirole, 1992), so it is always proﬁtable to pay the
politician in exchange for a hard signal that the project is good33.W ec a n
now look at the consequences for the trade-oﬀ between debt and FDI. Three
cases will occur:
- Case 1: with probability νξ , the project is good, the politician has a
signal GS, reveals it, and the full information solution is implemented.
- Case 2: with probability ν(1 − ξ) , the project is good, the politician
has no signal, and the asymmetric information solution prevails.
33Like the hidden part of an iceberg, in most societies the number of potential corrupt
transactions that are not realized is likely to largely exceed those that are. The true cost
of corruption is thus invisible but not less important: It lies in the incentive payments
necessary to prevent it.
24- Case 3: with probability 1 − ν , the project is bad, the politician has
no signal, and the asymmetric information solution prevails. Note however
that this case is similar to the complete information one, since the country
oﬀers
GW
2 and the ﬁrm has no rent anyway.
With two types of project and complete information, the trade-oﬀ be-
t w e e nF D Ia n dd e b ti sg i v e nb y :














2,W) corresponds to the second period proﬁto ft h ei n -
coming ﬁrm if the spillover is strong (resp. weak). Under asymmetric infor-
mation, the trade-oﬀ becomes (see Appendix 2):














Now, when renegotiation happens, with probability 1−νξ (the sum of the
probabilities of cases 2 and 3 above) the host country is uninformed about
the ﬁrm’s type. In particular, with probability ν(1 − ξ) (case 2), the good
t y p ei sa b l et om i m i ct h eb a do n e( r e m e m b e rt h a tw ea r ei nt h ec a s ew h e r e
ν ≤
GW
GS+GW , and thus the government oﬀer is
GW
2 , which corresponds to a bad
type project) and receives an extra gain from negotiating under asymmetric
information, thanks to a better status quo position (θΠF
2,W instead of θΠF
2,S)34.
Note thus that it is the interaction of the risk of repudiation (which induces
renegotiation with a certain probability) and of asymmetric information and
potential corruption (which modiﬁes the ﬁrm’s bargaining position in this
renegotiation) that together shift the trade-oﬀ.S i n c e ΠF
2,W is greater than
ΠF
2,S, it appears that an increase in the probability ξ that the politician has a
signal on the good project, shifts the trade-oﬀ marginally toward debt. When
the politician chooses the intensity of monitoring according to her potential
reward, ξ is higher in a more corrupt environment. The conclusion is then
that environments more prone to corruption tend to favor debt relative to
FDI35.
I summarize the insights from this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 An environment more prone to political corruption (lower
transaction costs of corruption, thus higher k) shifts the choice of investment
34ΠF
2,W corresponds to the second period proﬁt of the incoming ﬁrm if the spillover is
weak, i.e. if the ﬁrm retains a greater competitive edge, and is obviously greater than
ΠF
2,S.
35Similar comparative statics would be obtained with a more complex information struc-
ture in which a certain proportion of politicians is corrupt or equivalently the politician is
corrupt with some probability.
25toward debt. Moreover, the eﬀect of this type of corruption is eﬀective through
its interaction with the commitment variable γ.
The intuition is as follows: Asymmetric information gives ﬁrms choosing
FDI an edge in case of expropriation because they can then pretend to have
a higher outside option. The type of corruption that forces ﬁrms to share
information rents with politicians thus also reduces their incentive to chose
this organizational form. Technically, under asymmetric information, a good
type ﬁrm choosing the FDI option is able to mimic a bad type in case of
renegotiation and obtain a better payoﬀ. On the other hand, it is always
proﬁtable to give incentive payments to the politician in charge of bargaining
with the ﬁrm in order to reduce the asymmetry of information thus limiting
the extra beneﬁt arising under FDI in case of renegotiation. The more corrupt
the environment, the higher the politician’s monitoring eﬀort, the higher the
incentive payments and the more often complete information prevails, thus
reducing the interest for the good ﬁrm to choose FDI, and shifting the trade-
oﬀ marginally toward debt.
The next section presents some illustrative empirical evidence.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 The Data
Foreign Direct Investment as a share of total private capital ﬂows.
To measure the relative prevalence of FDI in a country’s composition of
capital ﬂows, I compute the amount of foreign direct investment, deﬁned in
section 1, as a share of total private capital ﬂows, consisting of private debt
(commercial bank lending, bonds, and other private credits) and non-debt
ﬂows (FDI and portfolio equity investment), using gross inﬂows data from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database36. I use average log values
for three successive periods: 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-1999, getting
cross-country samples of 68, 84, and 92 observations respectively, and an
unbalanced panel covering three periods and 106 countries (See in Appendix
3 the list of countries in the sample).
Risk of contract repudiation and corruption. To represent the level
of a country speciﬁc political risk in the sense of lack of commitment, I employ
36The test proposed here, using aggregated capital ﬂows data, must obviously be seen
as preliminary. In particular, it might be argued that not all private capital ﬂows have
to do with multinational ﬁrms’ operations (see a robustness check on this below), and
conversely that not all private borrowing is recorded as private capital ﬂows, for example
when it is secured by a domestic intermediary or a multilateral agency.
26an indicator of the risk of government repudiation of contracts, published
in the International Country Risk Guide by the private ﬁrm Political Risk
Service, Inc. As for corruption, I use the corruption index from the same
source. This index is a measure of “corruption within the political system,
which distorts the economic and ﬁnancial environment”. Arguably, although
diﬀerent corruption indices are the result of diﬀerent survey questions, they
are likely to be broad measures of the corrupt environment and are indeed
generally highly correlated with each other (see Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón, 1999). I thus ﬁrst use this variable both independently (as a proxy
for bureaucratic corruption), as well as interacted with the political risk
variable (proxying for political corruption). Alternatively, to account for the
concern that it may rather be capturing political corruption, I use an index
of bureaucratic quality, from the same source, as a proxy for bureaucratic
corruption.
These indices are available for the years 1985, 1990 and 1995 for all the
countries in the sample and, for the sake of interpretation, are rescaled from
0 (less risk, least corrupt) to 10 (more risk, most corrupt). I use beginning
of the period values to mitigate potential endogeneity problems.
Note that abstraction is made from quantitative and descriptive data on
cross-country institutional variations. Apart from the diﬃculty in obtain-
ing such “objective” data, there are more fundamental reasons to focus on
subjective data. First, objective data on corruption cases for example might
reﬂect both the prevalence of corruption, the legal categories of each coun-
try, and the eﬀectiveness of the anti-corruption ﬁght (Ades and Di Tella,
1999). Similarly, recorded rates of contract repudiation are subject to both
endogeneity (they both cause- and are aﬀected by- the ﬁrms’ operating mode
choices) and measurement error problems (there may be side agreements be-
tween ﬁrms and governments, while the “creeping expropriation” version is
harder to detect). Second, there is a revealed preference argument in favor
of subjective indices, in the sense that they capture the perceptions of the
agents, which are the relevant decision variables. Finally, it can be argued
that such data measure both the intrinsic quality of norms and rules and the
eﬃciency of their enforcement.
Other data37. The following control variables are included (again, be-
ginning of the period values are used when applicable): income measured by
GDP per capita, the openness of the economy proxied by the ratio of imports
to GDP, the size of the economy measured by total GDP, all three (in logs)
from the World Bank World Development Indicators; an index of inﬂation
37Part of this data set was kindly provided by the Inter-American Development Bank
Research Department.
27to proxy for macroeconomic stability (a higher value meaning less inﬂation),
from the Inter-American Development Bank; and a set of time-invariant char-
acteristics, including a measure of the value of the subsoil natural wealth of
a country and latitude, from the World Bank.
4.2 Empirical Results
Following the model, I test a speciﬁcation of the form:
FDI / total priv. K = α + β1 risk + β2 corruption
+β3 risk*corruption + β4 control var. + u,(17)
where β2 captures what I called the bureaucratic corruption eﬀect, while β1
and β3 correspond to the political risk and corruption dimension.
Table 2 shows the basic panel estimations, using the ratio of FDI to
total private capital ﬂows as dependent variable. The results support the
main conclusions above. The previous literature indicates that time-invariant
variables (soil and latitude) are important determinants of the composition of
capital ﬂows, but the use of these variables rules out ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation.
On the other hand, random eﬀect estimation is not the most suitable option
for cross-country data. Consequently, equations 1 to 3 are estimated without
intercept38, while time-invariant variables and regional dummies account for
some of the country eﬀects. In columns 4 and 5, ﬁxed eﬀects estimation are
performed as a robustness check, excluding time-invariant characteristics and
country dummies. In all cases, traditional controls (income, openness, size)
are introduced, as well as a full set of time dummies, which are meant to
capture some key structural evolutions that aﬀected ﬂows of capital during
the period under scrutiny, such as the end of the cold war, the launch of
t h eE Us i n g l em a r k e ta n dt h ec h a n g eo fa t t i t u d et o w a r d sF D Ii nd e v e l o p i n g
countries.
(Table 2 here)
The ﬁrst observation is that the risk of contract repudiation and its inter-
action with corruption give results consistent with the model, both variables
being of the expected sign and economically signiﬁcant in all ﬁve speciﬁca-
tions. For each point increase in the risk index (on a scale from 0 to 10),
38Alternatively, imposing a common intercept gives results almost identical to the no
intercept case.
28corresponding to a higher risk of contract repudiation, the share of FDI in
total private capital ﬂows increases by between 3 and 4%, while maintaining
that risk index constant, a one point variation in the corruption index has
an opposite eﬀect of between 0.5 and 0.8%39. We thus get very satisfying
support for the political corruption story of the model. Note that looking
at political risk, the net marginal eﬀect becomes negative for a value of the
corruption index at or above 6 (corresponding for example to the ranking of
Guatemala, Sudan or Pakistan in 1995).
As for the direct eﬀect of corruption, it is as expected in columns 1 and
2, where we get a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, indicating a marginal
eﬀect of around 1.5% for each additional point on the corruption scale of the
PRS index. This conﬁrms the idea that corruption has both an indirect eﬀect
through its interaction with political risk and a direct one, which I linked to
bureaucratic corruption. Moreover, in column 2, I test the possibility of a
decreasing direct marginal eﬀect of corruption, by introducing an interaction
between this variable and a dummy equal to 1 for a group of low corruption
countries40. The result supports the hypothesis of a lower marginal eﬀect for
more corrupt countries (1.7% against 2.3% for less corrupt ones). To assess
the possibility that the cross-country indices may have a limited ability to
capture diﬀerent types of corruption, column 3 presents a similar speciﬁca-
tion, where the corruption variable is replaced by the bureaucratic quality
index and an interaction with a high bureaucratic quality dummy. Results
are similar overall (the signiﬁcance of political risk and corruption actually
improves), with a signiﬁcant and negative bureaucratic eﬀect of around 1%
for the group of countries with better institutions41.
Fixed eﬀect estimations in columns 4 and 5, using the speciﬁcation of
columns 2 and 3, conﬁrm the robustness of the political corruption eﬀect,
with again very signiﬁcant results for both the political risk variable and its
interaction with corruption. The magnitude of the marginal eﬀects is un-
changed. The signiﬁcance of the direct eﬀect of corruption is lower, however.
In column 4, the interaction with the low corruption dummy yields a negative
but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for the low corruption country group, and so do
both the bureaucratic index and its interaction with the high bureaucratic
quality dummy. One possibility is that ﬁxed eﬀects indeed capture part of
39I obtain similar results when replacing the index of contract repudiation by an average
of this index with an index of the risk of investment expropriation.
40Diﬀerent cutoﬀ levels were tested and the one used in Table 2 (corruption index strictly
less than 3.33 on the PRS scale) proved the most signiﬁcant. Around 25% of the countries
in the sample are below this threshold.
41Those with a value of the index less than 3.33, which includes around 40% of the
sample.
29the direct corruption eﬀect at the country level, thus resting signiﬁcance to
the corruption and bureaucratic variables.
Note that risk and corruption have important explanatory power, as their
inclusion augments the part of the variance explained by the regression (the
R2) by around 15%. Moreover, about half of this eﬀect appears to be con-
ditional on the presence of the soil resources variable, while the soil variable
alone fails to rise the explanatory power of the estimations. An intuitive ex-
planation is that this variable captures the eﬀect of natural resources projects
(oil, mining), which generally call for direct involvement from multinational
ﬁr m sd u et ot h es i z eo ft h eﬁxed investment required and political strate-
gic considerations, and are particularly prone to the kind of risk discussed
in this paper. This is an interesting result calling for further investigation
s i n c et h ea g g r e g a t en a t u r eo ft h ed a t am a k e si td i ﬃcult to draw more precise
conclusions.
Standard controls, openness, size and level of development, as well as
inﬂation, are not signiﬁcant in columns 1 to 3, but become signiﬁcant when
allowing for country ﬁxed eﬀects. Richer countries get a higher share of
FDI, while the eﬀect of more openness and bigger size are negative. Higher
inﬂation, implying less macroeconomic stability, implies a higher relative
share of FDI.
As for invariant characteristics, latitude is signiﬁcant in regressions 1 to
3. Countries nearer the equator have a higher share of FDI in total capital
ﬂows. This variable has a similar eﬀect and performs better than a measure
of distance from the world main markets (the correlation coeﬃcient of these
variables is -0.70), so I conjecture that it partly captures a location motive
(FDI to overcome transport costs). Time dummies for the periods 1985-89
and 1990-94 are negative and very signiﬁcant, probably indicating the recent
change toward a more favorable perception of inward FDI ﬂows.
One potential limitation of this empirical test is that the link between
the ratio of FDI to total capital ﬂows and institutional quality variables may
be due to the movement of short term capital ﬂows, included in the left
hand side variable’s denominator, that may be quickly reversed in a scenario
of increased institutional uncertainty42. To test this hypothesis, Table 3
presents an additional set of estimations, where the dependent variable is
the ratio of FDI to private capital ﬂows now excluding portfolio investment
ﬂows.
(Table 3 here)
42I thank a referee for making this point and suggesting the robustness test below.
30The results conﬁrm the previous conclusions regarding political corrup-
tion, as the coeﬃcients of the risk of repudiation and the interaction with
corruption are again signiﬁcant and of the correct sign, with values fairly
similar in all the speciﬁcations tested. A one point increase in the risk in-
dex appears to have an average positive impact of between 3.7 and 5.4%
on the share of direct investment, while the eﬀect of corruption through its
interaction with risk is again about one sixth of the direct eﬀect.
The results on the direct eﬀect of corruption are also similar to those in
table 2, although the statistical signiﬁcance is somewhat lower. While the
soil wealth and the inﬂation variables lose signiﬁcance, latitude is consistently
and signiﬁcantly negative and the eﬀect of other basic control variables is also
unchanged. Overall, the results are little aﬀected by the exclusion of short
term capital ﬂows from the dependent variable denominator.
Thus, this preliminary evidence, based on aggregate data, is consistent
with the model’s predictions. The results strongly support the political cor-
ruption story. The direct eﬀect of corruption is also supported by the data,
although it appears somewhat less robust. These results are satisfactory
given the aggregate nature of the data and in particular the type of institu-
tional indices used, which arguably capture only imperfectly diﬀerent aspect
of institutional quality.
Finally, it is interesting to place these results in the context of the avail-
able historical evidence. This seems to indicate that the portfolio-direct
composition of private foreign investment has indeed long been sensible to
levels of development and risk. Lipsey (1999) refers earlier work showing
that “some 44 to 60 percent of the $19 billion of accumulated investment in
developing countries in 1913-14 was in the form of direct investment”, while,
“about 80 percent of the stock of long term investment in the United States
was portfolio investment.” He then adds that in the United States, foreign
portfolio investment went mainly to large and relatively safer investments,
while smaller and riskier investments in agriculture or manufacturing were
left to local ﬁnancing or individual foreign direct investors.
5C o n c l u s i o n
I have modeled the boundaries of the multinational ﬁrm, i.e. the ﬁnancial
structure of its involvement in a foreign country, by looking at a simple trade-
oﬀ between FDI (internal expansion) and debt (arm’s length expansion),
and analyzing the eﬀects of institutional constraints in host countries, i.e.
problems of commitment and, especially, corruption.
The model starts from the idea that capital ﬂows are more likely to take
31the form of FDI when the ability to commit of the recipient is low, because
in the case of contract repudiation (default or expropriation), the ﬁrm is able
to recover a greater proportion of its subsequent proﬁt, for example shifting
back some of its production to another location. I have then modelled two
diﬀerent aspects of corruption aﬀecting foreign investment, namely bureau-
cratic and political corruption. Bureaucratic corruption is shown to favor
debt against FDI, with a diminishing marginal eﬀect as corruption increases.
As for political corruption, it is eﬀective through its interaction with the
risk of repudiation variable and its sign is the opposite of the political risk
eﬀect, i.e. it again favors debt. These predictions are broadly supported by
cross-country panel empirical evidence.
This obviously challenges the generally accepted view in policy discus-
sions, according to which FDI is always a more favorable kind of external
capital for developing countries. Instead, it appears that the quality of in-
stitutions has important and complex consequences on the composition of
capital ﬂows, the bottom line being that a higher share of FDI might be the
sign of underdevelopment and riskiness, rather than attractiveness for foreign
investors. From a policy perspective, this analysis suggests shifting the focus
from the mere promotion of FDI to the determination of the optimal way to
attract foreign capital and technology, given the institutional characteristics
of a speciﬁcc o u n t r y .
From a theoretical perspective, a possible extension of the present line of
research is to integrate, beyond the simple composition eﬀect, the ﬁrm’s op-
tion to invest or not, for example in a multi-country setting where a decision
would be taken with respect to the realization and the location of invest-
ments. From an empirical perspective, this would give the basis for a more
systematic analysis of the eﬀects of institutional characteristics on both the
composition and the volume of capital ﬂows.
32APPENDIX 1
The extensive game with complete information is represented in ﬁgure 4
L chooses Y = (y1, G-y1)
F chooses p and X = (x1, G-x1)
(0,0)
1-p p






Figure 4: Extensive game with complete information
• In Stage 1: Country L proposes a payoﬀ y1(implicitly a pair Y =
(y1,G− y1),w h e r ey1 ≤ G).
• In Stage 2: The Firm F replies by proposing a payoﬀ x1(implicitly a
pair X =( x1,G− x1),w h e r ex1 ≤ G), and a probability p ∈ [0,1]. With
probability 1 − p the game ends and the outcome is the status quo. With
probability p it continues.
• In Stage 3: Country L chooses either X or the lottery p.Y (i.e. the
lottery giving Y with probability p and the status quo with probability 1−p).
I t sc h o i c ei st h eo u t c o m e .
Analyzing the game backwards, in stage 2 the ﬁrm chooses p (under the
constraint p ≤ 1)and x1 so as to maximize its ﬁnal payoﬀ,w h i c hi sg i v e n
by either pp(G −y1), if country L chooses p.Y ,o rp(G− x1) if the country’s
choice is X. Formally, the ﬁrm’s program is:
max
p,x1
[min(pp(G − y1),p(G − x1))] (18)
s.t. p ≤ 1.
33Anticipating that in stage 3, country L chooses between X and p.Y by
picking the highest value between px1 and ppy1, it is straightforward to see
that the ﬁrm will thus set p and x1 such that px1 = ppy1. Indeed, there is
no point in choosing p and x1 such that px1 < ppy1, since in this case X will
not be chosen anyway. On the other hand, if px1 >p p y 1,Fc a ni m p r o v ei t s
payoﬀ by reducing x1 until px1 = ppy1, still ensuring country L’s indiﬀerence
between X and p.Y .T h eﬁrm’s program thus reduces to:
max
p,x1
[p(G − x1)] (19)
s.t. x1 = py1
and p ≤ 1.
Substituting for x1, and leaving aside the constraint for the moment, this
becomes:
max
p [p(G − py1)] (20)
which yields p = G
2y1. Taking now into account the constraint, two cases
arise depending on the value of y1.S p e c i ﬁcally, if y1 ≥ G
2, p = G
2y1 (the
constraint is slack, which corresponds to the case where the ﬁrm punishes
the country for setting y1 too high, by picking a p lower than 1) and x1 = G
2,
while if y1 < G
2, p =1(the constraint is now binding) and x1 = y1.
Anticipating this, country L will choose y1 in stage 1, such that its payoﬀ
is maximal. It is straightforward to see that its optimal choice is also y1 = G
2,
thus leading the ﬁrm to choose x1 = G
2 and p =1 ,s ot h a tt h eo u t c o m eo ft h e






. Indeed, a value of y1 less than G
2 would
clearly be suboptimal, since the ﬁrm would simply choose x1 = y1 and p =1 ,
yielding to the country a lower payoﬀ than for y1 = G
2. On the other side, if
the country chooses y1 > G
2,t h eﬁrm’s rule leads it to react choosing x1 = G
2
and p = G
2y1, yielding again a payoﬀ lower than G
2 for the country (i.e. G2
4y1).
I now turn to the extensive game with asymmetric information:
• Stage 1: Country L chooses a payoﬀ y1 (at this stage a pair Y =
(y1,E(G) − y1), since it does not know the true value of G).
• Stage 2: The Firm, knowing its type, chooses a payoﬀ x1 (implicitly
ap a i rX =( x1,G R − x1),w h e r ex1 ≤ GR, the realized value of G,a n d
p ∈ [0,1]. With probability 1 − p the game ends and the outcome is the
status quo. With probability p it continues.
• Stage 3: Country L chooses either X or the lottery p.Y (where Y =
(y1,G R − y1)) .I t sc h o i c ei st h eo u t c o m e .
34As we see, the only diﬀerence with the complete information case is that
in stage 1, country L faces the problem of choosing y1 such that its expected
payoﬀ conditional on the realization of the ﬁrm’s type is maximum. Using
t h es a m ea p p r o a c ha sb e f o r ec o n c e r n i n gt h eﬁrm’s best response to any value




Ab a dt y p e( GW) chooses x1 = y1 =
GW
2 , p =1 , so the outcome is the
same as in the complete information case.
A good type (GS) chooses x1 = y1 =
GW
2 , p =1 ,(as in the complete
information setting when y1 < G
2).
The total expected payoﬀ for country L is ν
GW








A good type (GS) chooses x1 = y1 =
GS
2 , p =1 ,s ot h eo u t c o m ei st h e
same as in the complete information case.
Ab a dt y p e( GW) chooses x1 =
GW
2 , p =
GW
GS , (as in the complete infor-
mation setting when y1 > G
2).
The total expected payoﬀ for country L is now ν
GS




Consider now the case
GW
2 <y 1 <
GS





2 are dominated by y1 =
GW
2 and y1 =
GS
2 respectively).
A good type (GS) chooses x1 = y1, p =1 , (again, as in the complete
information setting when y1 < G
2).
Ab a dt y p e( GW) chooses x1 =
GW
2 , p =
GW
2y1 , (as in the complete infor-
mation setting when y1 > G
2).
The expected payoﬀ for country L is νy1 +( 1− ν)
G2
W
4y1 .T h i sp a y o ﬀ is a
convex function of y1, so that the value that maximizes country L’s expected
payoﬀ is either y1 =
GW
2 or y1 =
GS
2 depending on the values of ν, GW and
GS. Simple computations show that there is a threshold value ν∗ =
GW
GS+GW .
For ν below this value, y1 =
GW
2 ,w h i l ef o rν above it, y1 =
GS
2 , yielding the
outcome described in the text.
35APPENDIX 2
To see the eﬀect of asymmetric information, we have to use the decom-
position of the project’s payoﬀ into its two period components:
GS = G1 + G2,S
GW = G1 + G2,W.
When ν ≤
GW
GS+GW ,t h eﬁrm’s payoﬀsf r o me n g a g i n gi nd e b ta n dF D Ib e -




























































(1 − γ)G2,W + γθΠ
F
2,W.
Note that in U
F
FDI,AI the last term γθΠF
2,W reﬂects the fact that the good
type investor is taking advantage of the asymmetry of information to mimic
the bad type and have a better status quo position in the renegotiation. The
three payoﬀs above are received by the ﬁrm with respective probabilities νξ,
ν(1 − ξ),a n d1 − ν. Simple computations yield the trade-oﬀ:




















































































Note that now the ﬁrm has revealed its type in period 1 by choosing
between x1 = y1 =
GS
2 , p =1 ,a n dx1 =
GW
2 , p =
GW
GS ,s oag o o dt y p eh a s
no scope for pretending being a bad type in the second period renegotiation.
Similar computations as before show that in this case the trade-oﬀ is the
same as under complete information.
Consider ﬁnally an information structure where the politician also gets
information on the bad type project. The revelation of this piece of informa-
tion allows the implementation of the complete information solution, so the
eﬃciency loss is avoided. The politician might then threaten the ﬁrm not to






G2,S ) or I don’t reveal you are GW.”) For the same reason as before,
the FDI vs. debt trade-oﬀ is not altered by this possible extortion.
37APPENDIX 3
Countries in the sample: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongo-
lia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
S u d a n ,S u r i n a m e ,S w e d e n ,S w i t z e r l a n d ,S y r i a ,T a n z a n i a ,T h a i l a n d ,T o g o ,
Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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41Table 2. Dependent variable: Ln (FDI / Total capital flows) 
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Bureaucratic quality * 
dummy low bur. qual 














N  136 136 136 201 201 
R
2  0.37 0.39 0.37 0.71 0.70 
White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
Results significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
Regional dummies included: Latin America and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa, Most Developed Countries (Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand). 
Estimates for time and regional dummies are not reported.
42Table 3. Dependent variable: Ln (FDI / Total capital flows excluding portfolio 
investment flows) 
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N  131 131 131 196 196 
R
2  0.36 0.37 0.37 0.74 0.74 
White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
Results significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
Regional dummies included: Latin America and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa, Most Developed Countries (Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand). 
Estimates for time and regional dummies are not reported.
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